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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
GUST PAPADOPULOS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

·MARIO DEF ABRIZIO,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal From the Third District Court of Utah,
for Salt Lake County
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
INTRODUCTORY S'fATEMENT
Because appellant's brief conrmit~ errors of misstated facts, the analysis of this casl-~ adopt,~d- by
that brief "\\"ill not be followed. Instead~ we shall
mttke our own, properly authenticat~d ~tatemrnt of
facts proved and adopted by the trial court; then
point out errors in the statements of fact by appellant and indicate the results of such errorFi; then
a.rgue the ease under our analysis of the problon1s
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involved; and then answer briefly the points re..
maining which have been referred to by appellant
in his brief.

STATEME~NT

OF FACTS

This action is for damages for trespassing and for
injunctive relief: against a eorntinuing trespass. It
involves a S'ection of ground, namely, Section :Jl,
Township 2 South, Range 2 West, lying on the east
slope of the Oquirrh Mountain,s a :mile or two north
of Copperton. The land is marginal land. It is on
the fringe of the wheat land wh~ch .extends from
the valley up into the mountains, and on the fringe
of the grazing land which extends doV\rn from the
mountain to the cultivated land in the valley. rrhe
plaintiff and respondent is called Pappas. In 1935
he leased ~ection 31 and other contiguous land fro1n
I1. H. Gray, "rho wa~ a witness. (Exhibit A attachPd to the complaint). Pappas 'vent into possession
in 1935. He lambed his sheep in the spring of the
year upon the level portion of tlH~ section close to
the central "rater hole. His Rheep grazed the ~r(l
tion until about June 15th, 'vhen they were moved
to the ~ummer range. Thi ~ hP contiitued t0 do
through 1936 and 1937 ( Tr. 70~ 71, 73).
The defendant and appellant is called De fa. He
'Nas a farmer. He had an idea that he coul<l extend the wheat belt farther V\rest into the l1ills, and
'vith this in mind madP a lease w·ith Gray on April
6. 19~R, for portion~ of ~rction ijl (Exhibil :f).
Shortly after making thP- lease with Gray, Defa
found that Grav djd not have title to Sretion 31.
lie found that the County had become the O\vner hy
tax deed. On Ma)''" 4, 1938, he lPaRed fron1 the
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County a portion of the same land he had f.orn1erly
leased from Gray, all within Section 31 (Exhibit 1;
Tr. 109, 110, 121-123).

J

Pappas, as he was 'vont to do, drove his flocks onto
the land leased to him by Gray and found Defa in
possession of substantially all of Section 31.
Pappas learned from Defa that Gray no longer
owned Section 31, """hereupon Pappas immediately
went to Salt Lake County to secure a lease. Salt
Lake County gave to Pappas a lease of some t'vo
thousand acres, excluding Section 31 (Exhioit H;
Tr. 90, 91, 156, 109-113). Pappas acknowledged his
landlord Gray had no title to Section 31, and recognized Defa 's lease with Salt Lake County for
the section, and did in no way interfere with Defa's harvesting of his crop unde·r his lease with
Salt Lake County f.or 1938. The harvest was not
completed until in 1939 ('Tr. 73, 75-77, 112-113).
Pappas obtained a lease from Salt Lake County of
Section 31 and contiguous sections for the next
year, 1939. (Exhibit E). The Defa lease expired
May 4, 1939, and the Pappas lease commenced May
4, 1939.
Defa and Papp;as now knew that Gray had lost
his title. Pappas was out of possession for 1938,
and Defa was in possession. Pappas thereupon
notified Gray that he would pay no more rent and
had leased the land f~om the County (Tr. 137; Exhibit K, Exhibits H and E; Tr. 140, 142-143, 157,
138).

Tn 1939 Pappas went into possession of Section 31

nnder the terms of his lease with Salt Lake County
(Exhibit E). He has remained in possession fro1n
that time until the commencement of this action
(Tr. 73, 75, 94, 80, 86, 158, 159, and Exhibit I). Defa 'va~ unable to renew his lease with Salt Lake
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County, "'hich expired 1\iay 4, 1939. He then fell
back upon his earlier lease with L. H. Gray. This
he sets forth in his answer and amended answer
(Tr. 21, 20, 27). In reliance upon Gray's title which
Defa had repudiated, he began to plow and plant
,Section 31 in 1940 (Tr. 78, 79, 82, 113, 119, 159). It
is the trespass of plo"\\ri.ng up the feed for Pappas's
flock with the loss of grazing and damage to his
sheep of which the respondent complains. No question is raised by appellant as to respondent's right
to an injunction if it he assumed that the trespass
by appellant is established.

ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
.
Respondent duly moved this Court to diminish thr.
record in these proceedings hy striking all refer~ence to a certain deed called Exhibit 1, which was
an auditor's deed given by Salt Lake County, and
which motion was granted. Because of the repeated reference to this instrument (Br. 6, 7, 16, 17,
28, 29) and its legal effect upon these proc~edings
as well as frequent and numerous state1nents not
supported by the record, appellant~s brief in largf:l
part must he disregarded in considering the orderly
presentation of the points of law involved.
According to the statement of appellant's counsel
the striking of Exhibit 1, the deed from Salt Lake
·county, cost appellant his case, because his brief
at page 6 stated: "That is the eontrolbng undisputed fact in this case. And upon that fact, and
upon that undisputed record, the 'vhole case
tnrns. ''
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Statements in appellant's brief not supported by
the record are:
Page 4, lines 9, 10, 11:
Respondent did not claim as a tenant of L. li.
Gray except for the years 1935, 1936: 1g37
(see Para. 2 of Complaint). From 1938 to
1941 he claimed as a tenant of Salt Lake
County only (Complaint, Para. 5, 6, 7; Tr. 2,
3, also Tr. 137, 138, 140, 142-143, 157).
Page 4, lines 22-29:
Plaintiff and defendant met on Section 31 in
April, not on ~:lay 4, 1938 ('l~r. 111, 159). Mr.
Rushton talked to appellant, not to both parties (Tr. 121, 122).
Page 4, lines 30-36, Page 5, lines 1-5:
There is no evidence that the parties went to
the courthouse together or were there at the
same time, and no evidence that anything was
done ''by mutual consent and agreement.'!'
(See Tr. 91-92, 110-112 121, 156-157).
1

Page 6, lines 19-34, all of Page 7 except bottom
four lines:
All this relates to the exhibit which was stricken
and m-qst be disregarded.

Page 7, last four lines:
There is no evidence that defendant (arpellant) was in possession after harvesting the
crop in 1939 until plowing was done in 1940.
Page 16, lines 5-9:
There is no support for this sentence. The
parties learned that the County had taken the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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land for taxes, but neither volunteered anything for L. H. Gray.
Page 16, line 20 to P'age 17, line 5:
This relates to the stricken exhibit and must
be disregarded.

Page 2:1, line 7 :
The landlords L. H. Gray and Western Land
A.ssociation did not have the record title; (see
Exhibits A, B, C, D).
Page 25, bottom paragraph:
The brief cites no reference to evidence of
appellant's possession or to any admissions.
The statement must be disregarded.
Page 27, bottom four lines:
There is no evidence that respondent was on
Section 31 on ~lay 4, 1938.
Page 28, lines 5-12:
No .evidence suppotrts their statement r.:bo~ut
appellant and respondent going to the county
commissioners together or taking any mutual
joint or agreed action in procuri11£' lea~es.
Each acted alone, for his best inter~st~, nnd
without regard to the other (l'r. Jl, 110, 121123, 125, 156-1f>S).
Page 28, lines 13-21:
This relates to the stricken exhibit and must be
disregarded.
With the~se erroneous statements and reference~
out of the brief the arguments ·under assig1nnents
numbered I, IV and V faJl because their support is
takPn a'vay. These arguments must he disregarded
lJv the Court. AsRi!!nPd error No. III ~q frivolons
aiid will be di"rega~ded. Assigned errors II, VI
and VII will be dealt with subsequently.
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POINTS IN\7 0LVJ1JD
Because appellant's brief is confusing with its
erroneous statements it will not be answered in the
order of its points.
This appeal raises four questions, or four legal
propositions 'vhich are stated from the point of
vie'v adopted by the trial court:
1. During all times here material plaintiff and respondent had the right to possession of Section 31.
2. Defendant and appellant trespassed
upon Section 31 in 1940.
3. Respondent is not estopped to assert
the County's title.
4. The award of $425.00 damages was
proper.

ARGUMENT

I.
DURING ALL TIMES HERE MATERIAL
PijAINTIFF AND RESPO·NDENT HAD
THE RIGHT TO POSSE·SSION OF SECTION 31.
Paragraph 9. of the complaint and finding No. X
(Tr. 4, 32) allege and find a trespass by app·ellan t
on Section 31 of the land leased by respondent from
Salt Lake County, which lease included all of Section 31, except the South half of the Southeast
Quarter (Exhibit 11J). The judgment of the court
enjoined appellant from interfering with the re~pondent 's possession of Section 31, and the whole
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thereof, except the South half of the Southeast
Quarter (Tr. 35). Exhibits A, B, and C show that
this land was formerly O\vned by George H. Dorton
and the Western Land Association, and was conveyed by auditor's deed to Salt Lake County on
~!arch 31st and April lOth, 1936. Exhibit 1 shows
the lease of this land to appellant for one year frorn
May 4, 1938. Exhibit E shows the lease of this
land by Salt Lake County to the respondent for one
year from June 14, 1939, \vhich lease was extended
to June 15, 1941, by act of the Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County (E~hibit F).
It is true that appellant's lessor, \Vestern Land
-~ssociation acquired the property from Salt Lake
County on December 6, 1940 (Exhibit D). But this
deed was made subject to existing leases or agreeInents made by Sa1t Jjake County, which would include the lease referred to as Exhibit E.
J~~espondent

thns establishes ownership of the land
by his lessor through tax sale and a lease to hi1n,
\vhich is sufficient title, unless attacked, under
R. S. lJ. 1933, 80-10-35, as Amended in 1939.
~t\.ppellant offered no evidence attacking this taY
title and the lease to respondent. On the contrary
appellant recognized this title in Salt Lake County
by leasing this very land from the County in 1938,
(Exhibit 1), and appellant's lessor recognized this
paramount title by purchasing the property along
with other property in 1940. (Exhibit D). Thus
all parties have recognized the County's title to
the land, and the County leased to respondent and
none other for the period from June 14, 1939, to
June 15, 1941, which includes all of the periods pertinent to this controversy·.
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II.
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT TRESPASS ..
ED UPON SECTION 31 IN 1940.
Respondent took possession of Section 31 in the
~pring of 1939 and protected appellant's crop by
hiring two extra sheep herders (Tr. 73, 75 ). He
continued in possession by grazing Section 31 in
the fall of 1939 (Tr. 94) and the spring· of 1940 (Tr.
73, 80, 86, 103, 105, 154, 158-159; Exhibit I). Respondent was on the land in ~1ay: 1940, when appellant or his boys commenced plowing and gradually
drove respondent's sheep off of Section 31 and
away from the water hole (Tr. 78, 79, 83).
It is plain that respondent had the right of posses .
sion and pos·session in :'Jfay, 1940, when appellant
came to Sectiton 31 and plowed. Either possession
or right of possession is enough to support an action
of tre~pass to real property.
26 Ruling Case Law 955-960.

Cases Cited at 4th Decennial Digest, Vol.
29, Trespass, Sers. 20 ( ·~) ~ 20 ( 3), 20
( 4).

III.
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED
ASSERT THE COUNTY'S 'TITLE.

TO

At page 15, appellant's brief states that the complaint was demurrable under R. S. U. 1933, 104-2-14,
and Woodbury v. Bunker, Steele et al, 98 Utah 216.
The rase is considered infra. The statute simply
P~tabli~hes a statntory presumption which can be
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overcome by evidence. ~~or a somewhat similar
statutory interpretation see
Jackson v. James, g7 Utah 41, 46; 89 l)ac.
(2d) 235.
.
And the cornplaint overcame the presumption by
alleging loss of the property and dispossession under plaintiff's landlord with a suhs~quent lease
from Salt Lake County, under which he went into
possession (Complaint, para. 4, 7 ; Tr. 2, 3). The
complaint was therefore not demurrable but thP
question of estoppel under the evidence is one
which requires attention.
It is true that ap.p·ellant and respondent leased
from the same landlord, L. H. Gray (indeed they
leased from another common landlord, Salt Lake
County). Respondent had possession,. claiming
under L. H. Gray, during the years 1935, 1936 and
1937 ( Tr. 70, 137), but lost the land on April 24,
1938, because of a paramount title in Salt Lake
County (Exhibit 1; Tr. 73, 75, 110, 112). Appellant planted and harvested a crop in 1938 and 19~9.
Appellant knew that respondent wa.s out of possession then, but so did L. H. Gray, the· alter e~o {T!·.
136) of the vVestern T_jand Association (Tr. 137,
188, 140, 142, 143, 157; Exhibit K)~ To defeat the
estoppel respondent relies upon the fact that he
lost possession becauEt€ of a title para1nount to his
landlord (see Exhibit A). advised his landlord of
this, advised his landlord that he was leasing from
the paramount title holder, and repudiated the
lease from L. H. Gray· and as to part of the land,
that he is not denying' his landlord's title but .I~
simply asserting that title which was transferred
to Salt IJake County.
As appears from Exhibit A, attached to the complaint, plaintiff 'vas under obligation to L. H. Gray
to pay a yearly rental for a portion of Section 31,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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au.

w·hich is the property defendant has trespa~~Pd
upon. Under the terms of said lease ''failing to
1nake said payments, the lease stands terminated
vvithout further notice.'' When defendant Defa
told plaintiff Pappas in April, 1938, "'hile standing upon the land in question, that L. H. Gra.y no
longer had any right to lease Section 31 but that
he, Defa, had a lease from Salt Lake County, plaintiff went to Salt Lake County to verify this statement (Tr. 91, 110, 121, 156-157). Upon learning
that the records of the County Reeorder 's office of
Salt !Jake County showed that ~A.uditor 's Tax
Deeds to most of Section 31, including all of the
land here in q uesiion, had been iss nect to Salt Lake
County in 1936, which deeds were introduced in
evidence as Exhibits A, B, and C, plaintiff Pappas
went to see I1. H. Gray. Pappas then offered to
lease from L. H. Gray a certain Section 3 which
had not been sold for taxes and tn pay a -p.roporti0n
of rent for said sertion. This, Gray refused to do
and Pappas refused to pay further rent upon said
lease to I.J. H. Gray (Tr. 139-142, 157). Pappas
had leased other sections than Section 31 for 1938
from Salt !Jake County 'vhich appears in evidence
fron1 Exhibit H. In the san1e year defendant Defa
leased from Salt T.Jake County ,for one year comJnencing on the 4th day of May1 1938, portions of
Section 31 (Exhibit 1). Plaintiff did not retake
posRession until May, 1939.
The legal effect of these circumstances a.nd contract was to terminate the relationship of landlord
and tenant between Pappas and Gray. In the caRe
of Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 Utah 216, the Court
considers a question not similar but analogous to
the problem at hand. In that case the question
arose whether or not a tenant may, consistent with
the forcible entry and detainer statutes, claim posR(l~!"!ion under a ~11 hr;:eqnent purchaser of the tax
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title without prior notice to and without first terminating occupancy and possession under his
original lessor. By the converse rule the plaintiff herein, having given his former landlord
notice and having refused to pay further rent and
having been ousted from possession by a lessee of
the owner of the land in 1938, may thereafter lease
said land from the legal owner of the property, and
assert his lease against the former lessor or par..
ties in privity with said lessor.
The application of the Woodbury case to the situation of the app·ellant herein would prevent him
from claiming to be a lessee of Salt Lake County,
he-cause he leased frlQm the County while in pos~ession under Gray and without termination of tenancy, loss of possession, or notice to. Gray. The
appellant recognized the County's title by leasing
from it in 1938, and Gray recognized that ·title by
purchasing from the County in 1940 (Exhibit D),
which purchase was made subject to respondent's
lease. Respondent claims under the County's title
""hich has not been questionPd in this casr, and
v:hich indeed has been recognized by both the appellant and- Gray; and although the apr;ellant recognizes the C1ounty's title, he is estopped to assert
it as in conflict with Gray's title under Woodbury
v. Bunker.
In furth~e~ support of this position numerous cases
have been decided by many jurisdictions supporting
. the general proposition "\vhich is well stated in the
ease of
Jenkinson v. \Vinans (M~ehL (;7 ·~. '\V.
549 at Page 550 :
"Though the tenant cannot sho,v that the
lPs~or had no title to the pre~mises when the
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tenancy commenced, he may sho"\v that the
lands haYe been sold at tax sales, and the
landlord's title thereby extinguished. The
estoppel extends only to the title \Vhich
the landlord had at the time of leasing. If
that title has been extinguished, it may be
shown; for then the landlord has no right
to the possession. As was said in 1\fcGuffie v. Carter, 42 Mich. 497, 4 N. W. 211,
'The rule is fanlilia,r that both tenant and
those in privity, either in blood or estate,
are estoppea from disputing the title of the
landlord, or the title of anyone' who succeeds to his rights, so long as they hold the
possession originally derived from him.
But this principle does nqt forbid the tenant from showing that the landlord's title
has expired, or has been extinguished by
his o"\\·u act or operation of law,)_. citing
Lamson v Clarkson, ] 13 '}\[ass. 348; Fuller
v. Sweet, 30 Mich. 2'37; Hilbourn v. Fogg,
99 Mass. 11; D~sp1ard .v. \Valhrid!ge, 15
N.Y. 374~ Mountnoy v. Collier, 1 El. & Bl.
630, 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 232. ''
'rltis case arose in Michigan under a set of facts
very similar to the case at bar. The plaintiff 'vho
had lost the land on ta.x sale, 'vas atten1pting to
onf-t the defendant who had leased the land from
1l new owner under tax sale.
The defendant had
hren ousted by the purchase-r under tax sale and
had then agreed with the ne'v owner for a lease of
the pr10perty. As above indicated, the Court held
th:1t the defendant could deny his former landlord's
~.i t.l e under such cirflnmstances .
To the same effect see the case of
Bo"rman v. Goodrich, (Neb.) 144 N.W.

240:
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Hartzog v. Seeger. Coal Co (Tex.) 163 S. W
1055 at 1059.
De:B~orest v. vV alters (N .. Y.) 47 N. E. 294
at 297.
_1.\nnrotation: '' It is accordingly a \\ell ecitablished rule forming an exception to
or limitation upon the general operation
of the rule that a tenant is estopped to
deny his landlord's title, that the tenant
may show that, since the beginning of his
tenancy, the title or interest of the landlord has passed to a third person."
38 L.R.A. (NS) 863.
It is, therefore, evident that Defa having leased the
section in 1938 from Salt Lake County could .not
thereafter deny Salt Lake County's title, anu that
Papp~as p·roperly terminated his lease with L.II.Ur~ly
\vhose title e-xpired, and properly enteTed into a
lease '\\rith Salt I.~akP County for Section 31. in 1939
and 1940, 'vhich lease continued to June 15, 1941.

IV.
THE A W...t\RD OF $425.00 DAMAG.FJS
!)ROPER.

\VA~

Appellant assails the judgment for dan1ages at
page 29 of his brief simply by stating his opinion
that damages for loss of lambs and gra~ing were
not' proper under the complaint. The eYidence
eited at pages 29-33 has nothing to do \\'"ith this
1uestion.
lTnder plaintiff's lease fron1 Salt Lake County the
plaintiff was entitled to the possession of SPct!on
31, excepting only t\vo forty-acre tracts along the
s:outh line of the east half of the S'ection. l,l viola·
tion of plaintiff's posRession, defendant caine upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the lanJ in 1~40 and plo\ved up approxin1aLely three
hundred acres of the best feed "I thin the section.
A.ll of the rented portion of the section \Yas destroyed for feed, with the exception of the gullies
covered \vith heavy brush. 'l'he central \vateting
hole for all of plaintiff's grazing land is locatt~d
in the middle of this section ('1'1'. 71). rrhe best
lambing gTound available in all of phuntiff 's leased
ground is located upon thi~ section, and all of the
fiat portions which have been (•leared and are without brush and especially used by the plaintiff for
lambing, have been plowed hy the defendant.
( Tr. 82, 84-85) .

...

I'

l_

The complaint· (Tr. 1-9) plainly allegeR in paragraph 9, loss of use of the land in Section 31 for
grazing, and the prayer fixes the damage for this
ttem at $175.00. This damage i8 for loss of feed,
and could be shown in either of two obvious ways:
(a) by sho,ving what feed \vas lost and fixing its
1narket value, or (h) by
- «sho"~in!?.·. the tnarket val uP
of land required to replace tl1e lost feed. (See Tr.
~1)
The plaintiff te~ti:fied at 1'ranscript 87 that
the rented land 'va~ not as Q'ood as Section 31 which
it wa~ to supplant. and that tlte feed fro1n Sec-tion
Rl was worth more than the feed which he_,got from
the extra rented land ThiR ~fiR(\ therefore. see1n~
to come \\"'ell within the men~.1.1re of da.Tnag€s used
tn
Anderson Vo .JP-n~Pn, 71 lTtah 29!1;
referred to hereinafter. R~e also
-,
'Villiston, RevisPd ~Clition, Sections 1354
and 1384.
o

0

0

The rule iR statPrl at
15 Am .•Jur. r1~9, aR follo'v~:

"It has been held, more-over, that if th0
property is

~nrl1

thnt it rannot hP rPpla(·r·(l..
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the measure of damages is th~~ amou11t such
property is ordinarily \Vorth for use. If it
can be replaced, however, the da1nages are
the cost of hiring the property \rhich the
owner is forced to substitute for it.)'
The she~ep of the plaintiff a.t lan1bing time "\Vere cmn~
pelled to seek higher ground where feed was available. This made it necessary for ewes to leave their
lambs some considerable distance in order to obtain water. It was physically impossible fur the
plaintiff to prevent ewes from losing their la.n1bs,
a.nd, as a result, plaintiff has been ila.ntaged to the
extent of $250.00 for loss of and damage to his
herd.
It is admitted that thP gene-ral rule is that, findings
of fact outside the issues rais(;J by the pleadings
cannot be given effect by the Appellate Court; hut
the question here is whether this general rul~3 has
any application to this case. In the first plaee, th/}
finding is supported b~ the allegations o ~ special
damage in the complaint; secondly, evidence of loss
of lambs was adrnissible as an element of general
damages ; and, in the third place, since no objection
\vas made to the introduction of evidenee on thig
issue, the case falls \vithin a \vell recognized exception to the general rule stated.
The finding in question is 10 (a) :
That on or about May 20, 1940, to
and including June 1 1940, defendant
plo,ved a portion of the above described
property, being more particularly a portion
in that part of Section 31 which was leased
by the plaintiff from Salt Lake County under date of tTune 14, 1939, and which
land was heretofore used primarily for
lambing and constituted the best lambing
'' (a)

1
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ground of the plaintiff. That said ground
"·as in the in11nediate proximity of "'ater
for ewes that w·ere la1nbing and enabled
e"Tes to reach the "·ater 'vith their lamLs.
That by reason of said plo,ving of said portions of said s·ection, the use of said property for grazing and lambing of plaintiff's
sheep and for the watering of plaintiff's
sheep during lambing was destroyed so
that plRintiff was compelled to larnb hi~
flocks upon undesirable land ren1ote from
said watering hole thereby causing thP. loss
of approximately fifty lambs, to :ola.i.ntiff's
damage and preventing the use of sai<i
property heretofore required for grazing·
purposes by the plaintiff.'~
It is true that the finding is more explicit than the
complaint as to the manner in which defendant's
trespass damaged plaintiff in reference to use of
the land for purposes of lambing. The complaint
alleged in paragraph 3 that the land described ''is
useful to plaintiff for the grazing, shearing and
lambing of sheep,'' and in paragraph 8 that ''on or
about April 25, 1940, plaintiff drove his 2,000 head
of sheep on said property for the purpose of grazing, shearing and lambing said sheep.'' An jn i~ar
agra.ph 9 (a) that defendant"s plowing of the land
destroyed ,''the use of the property for grazin.~ ol'
for shearing of plaintiff's sheep thereby causing
damage to plaintiff;'' and in paragraph 9 (b) that
defendant's plowing rendered
'' R·aid propertv bv virtue of the destruction
of feed and the ouster of possession of 1iLtle
,.,.alue for the purposes of grazing, shearing' and la.mbjng- plaintiff's sheep and renderin~ all of the prop·erty described in parng-T~a:ph 6 of Ht.tlP value, thP ROO acres ".,.l:ir'h
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was plowed being the most valuhble f;razing land of all of the said tracts, without the
use of which the property under lease could
not and cannot support plaintiff's sheep
during lambing and shearing time ; ''
and in the p~rayer the plaintiff indicates thr 8peeifie
relief desired and the kind of case the plaintiff supposes he has made by the use of the follo".,.h!g \vorda:
''. . . plaintiff prays judgment . . . for
ds.mages ~uffered
. . through plowing
of land . . . ror loss of grazing . . . and
for damage to sheep and loss of lambs.''
See Bancroft's Code Pleading, S-ection 12.
It plainly app.ears that plaintiff has alleged damage
for the loss of the use of the alleged property for
grazing, and sp~ecial damage to sheep and loss. of
lambs, which is an incident of the loss of grazing.
But if it be assumed that the darnage was not
specially p~eaded, the judgment is still. supportable.
A valuable precedent on this question is
Anderson, et a.l. v. Jensen, et al., 71 ·utah
295: 265 Pac. 745.
··
This was also a case involving treBpass t0 land
'vhich wa.s valuable for grazing and lan1bing sheep,
l?ut the tresp~ass in that case was by sheep rather
than by plowing the land. It appears that plaintiff
0\Vned ]and along the bottom near a creek which
".,.as ~heltered and therefore valuable for laml·ing
ground; whereas the defendant'~ property was
higher up and not so valuable for lambing. De·
fendant permitted hi~ shElep tn g;raze a portion of
the lamhine: Q'rouno, nsin!!' it a1R0 for the purpoRe
of lamhing; thereby keeping plaintiff's ~heep off
because of the danger of getting the la1nbs of the
t'vo p::t rtieR mi-xed np. The complaint sought ilanlages for loss of URP of the land both for gra~ing
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and for lan1bing and al-so sought an injunction
against continued trespass. The evidence sho,ved
that the land was valuable for grazing and that i~;
had a separate value as lambing ground. 'l'he
Court referred to this as follows :
"The evidence tends to show that plaintiffs' land along Sheep Creek is especially
desirable for lan1bing sheep because it is
\rarm, comparatively level, and protected
fro1n the spring winds and storms. It is
also made to appear that it is a distinct
advantage to have sheep, while lambing,
near water becaus-e if the ewes are compelled to travel any considerable distance
to secure water there is danger of the
young lambs being lost from their mothers.''
Defendant took the p·osition that plaintiff's dam..
age could he measured only by the value of the forage eaten and destroyed by def~enda.nt 's sheep and
also contended "that proof affecting any en..
hanced rental value of the land in question because
of its adaptability for lan1bing sheep is in the
nature of special damages and must be specially
pleaded to admit proof thereof.'' In rejecting this
contention of defendant, the Court made the follow·
i ng holding:
''In determining such reasonable rental
value, the fact tha.t the land may be valuable for lambing purposes is as proper a
n1atter of inquiry as is the fact that the
land may be valuable for grazing purposes.
The ultimate fact to he determined is the
reasonable rental value of the land, and
any fact which aids in determining such
n1t1mate faet is proper evidence under thP
1
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general issue of damages and need not be
specially pleaded.''
It thus appears that the value of the land for lambing. "\Vas separate and apart from the value of the
land for grazing and that this separate value was
not an element of sp~ecial damage which required
specific pleading.
A somewhat similar case is
Drinkh!ouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359 ; 260
Pac. 869,
'.vhich was an action in replevin for a race horse,
the plaintiff claliming $10,000.00 damage for the
value at the time of taking and $10,000.00 damage
for loss of us.e during the detention. Over defendant's strenuous objection evidence was received as
to the value of the horse as a racing pony and also
as to its value for breeding purposes both because
of the races it had won and the races its colts had
won ; and evidence was further received over objection as t10 the horse's earnings as a stud horse
during the period of detention. The defendant o~
jected that plaintiff was attempting to prove spe.
cial damag'es under an allegation of general dam..
a.g1e and on appeal objected to the finding of these
special damages a.s not supported by the issues of
the complaint. The Court held, however,. that the
value of the horse at tl1e time of the taking included
its value for all purposes and that it was therefore
proper to show its value for breeding purposes as
a stud horse.

There is no showing here that the appellant was
surprised, misled or prejudiced by the introduction of p-roof as to loss of lambs. In
Moyle v. McKean, 49 Utah 93, at Page 99;
162 Pac. 63,
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where a similar ground for reversal
the Court, the Court said:

\\~as

urged upon

''It is also insisted that a certain finding
'is not "rithin the allegations of the complaint.' \·rhile it is true that there are no
allegations in the complaint in the precise
form of the finding, yet the finding is fairly ";ithin the purvie"r of the allegations ~of
the complaint and is responsive, thereto.
That assignment must therefore also fail.''
Here the prayer of the complaint plainly advised
the defendant of the nature of the case pJaintiff
was attempting to make. The pr·ayer asked for
"$175.00 for loss of grazing and $250.00 for damage to sheep and loss of lambs.'' It is held in
~fcPheete-rs

v. 1\IcMahon, 131 Cal. App. 418;
21 Pac. ( 2d) 606,

that in determining whether reversible error was
committed in the introduction of evidence outside

the pleadings the prayer may be consulted to determine the nature of the case which plaintiff Intended to make. ..A.nd in
Neel v. Ramelli, 138 Cal. App. 366; 32 Pac.
(2d) 177,

0vidence was introduced on a question of adverse
posses·sion upon which findings of fact were made
although not pleaded in the complaint. In upholding the lower court's judgment the Court of
Appeals suggested that the general allegations of
the complaint were sufficient to raise the issue and
\vent on to say:
•'hut, if not, the appellant Waf.; not prejudiced because he was fully· appri sril. o I'
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the issues to be tried and was given ample
opportunity to present his defense.''
And it likewise app·e~ars here that defendant was
fully advis.ed of the issues of the ease and of a
claimed element of damage for loss of land. An
argument that a technical defect e:xisted in ~ com~Jlaint should not be favored by this Court since it
is not in the interest of justice and is an encouragement to obstructive tactics in litigation.

R. S. U. 1933, 104-13-1; 104-14-1.
But assuming for the sake of argument only that
the finding referred to was not within the issues oJ
.the complaint, the finding is still supportable in
this Court. The plaintiff testified as to the loss
of lambs beeause of defendant's trespass (Tr. 8385). Defendant made no objection to this testi·
mony except to the testimony as to the price for
which lambs were sold, and as to this his only objection was, ''I object to that unless you fix the
time.'' And to Steve ~Iartinez' testimony as to
]oss of lambs at Page 105 of the transcript no ob-jection whatever was interposed.
It is well established that where no objection is made
to the introduction of evidence ,vhich is outside
the specific issues of the pleadings, the court may
make findings on such issues, which findings will
be upheld by the Appellate Court.
Stephens v. Doxey, 62 Utah 241; 218 Pac.
965.
Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, 37 Utah
334, 238; 108 Pac. 11:~2.
Houtz v. Union Pacific, 33 Utah 175, 19j;
93 Pac. 439; 17 r~.R.A. (N.. S.) 628.
Kaiser v. l{aiser, 106 Cal. App. 6GS; 289
Pac. 875, 876.
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Crescent Lun1ber Co. Y. Lars·on, 166 Cal.
168; 135 l~a.c. 502.
Smith v. Golden State Syndicate, 43 Cal.
App. 346; 185 Pac. 209, 210.
Stark,veather v. Eddy, 87 l~al. Ap·p. 92;
261 Pac. 763.
McDougal v. Hulet, 132 Cat 154; 64 Pa.c.
278.
Conlon v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 108
~font. 473; 92 Pac. (2d) 284.
Hansen v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif·oTnia,
55 Idaho 483; 44 P'ac. (2d) 709, 714.
North Electric Mfg. Co. v. Shelley, 32 Ohio
App. 379; 168 N. E. 216.
Shelley v. Board of Trade, 87 Cal. App.
344; 262 Pac. 403.
In Stephens v. Doxey, supra, the appellant coin-plained that a finding eovered a different strip of
ground than that alleged. The Court said at Page
249 of 62 Utah:
''This is assigned as error on the ground
that the change was not pleaded, and, therefore, not made an issue. It is not claimed
the finding is ,,rj thout evidence to support
it, or that such evidence was objected to
by defendant. The assignment is without
n1Pri t.''
fn Kaiser v. Kaiser, supra, 'vhich was an a.ction for

nreounting on a farm leased by defendant to the
plaintiff the defendant app·ealed partly on the
g-flound that some findings were made on matters
11ot pleaded. As to this, the California Court said:
"Appellant contends that there is a fatal
v~rianrr between the allegations of the
romnlaint. and the evidenrP, and that Rome
of the findings hased on tl1at evidence RrP
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outside the issues. Such evidence, however,
was admitted without objection, ~and the defendant introduced evidence bearing upon
all the ultimate facts found by the court.
It may fairly be stated, therefore, that the
case was tried on the theory that such facts
we~re in issue, and neither party was misled to his prejudice.''
In (~rescent Lumber Co v. La,rson, supra, the Court
quoted the_ general rule that a finding entirely out..
side of the issues must be disregarded and then
noted the £ollowing exception to this rule :
'' Th!e rule just stated is subject to the
qualification that a finding may be considered where the issue though not formally raised by the pleadings, was tried in the
court below without objection. Ill. T. & S.
Bank v. Pac. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. .285, 47 Pac.
60; Sprigg v. Barber, 122 Cal, 573, 55 Pac.
419."
And in Stark,veather v. Eddy, supra, at Pa.ge 765
of 261 Pacific, the Court said :
''It has been frequently held that, where
a cause is tried upon the theory that certain facts are in issue, after judgn1ent the
cause will be considereii a.s though such
i ~sues 'vere correctly tendered by the
pleading.''
The test of prejudicial error should be whether the
party complaining was misled or prejudiced. As
said in
Mankin v. Southwestern Automobile Insurance Company, '113 Cal. A.pp. 243 ; 298
J>ac. 4-2 at 43:
''Strictly. speaking, the complaint should
have alleged surh 'vaiver before the evidence
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""n~ received, or should have been ameudell

to conform "·ith the proof. It 8een1s very
clear, however, that the irregularity of vro-cedure in failing· to make such ruuendn1en t
to the complaint has not resulted in any
miscarriage of justice.''

And in
Dudley v. Peterson, 42 Arizona 282; 25
Pac. (2d) 276 at 278,
the Court held that although pleadings should ha:ve
been amended to conform to the evidence at the
time evidence 'vas introduced, it was not reversible
error and the case would not be remanded where it
was plain that the pleading would be amended and
the same evidence would be offered on a new trial.
Appellant may remonstrate that he rnade son1e ob .
jection to introduction of this evidence, even though
not the right objection or at the right time. (See
Tr. 85). This argun1ent is definite~ly rejected by
Geanakoules v. Union Portland Ce1nent
Company, 41 Utah 486, at Pagie 489;
126 Pac. 329.

APPELLANT'S POINTS
ALJ.JEGATIONS OF ANSWER ADMITTED BY
FAILURE TO REPLY
Appellant raises one or two questions which have
not been answered. At pages 8 and 21 of his brief
appellant suggests that the allegations of the answer we~re admitted by our failure to reply, citing
it S. U. 104-11-2 and 104-13-11. These statutes,
u.pplied to the pleadings, are sufficient and"\\ter to
appellant. The answer was not a connterclain1 because it asked for nothing. It alleged lease~ to the
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appellant from L. H. Gray and from Salt Lake
County (Tr. 20, 27), which were but a denial, in
tffect, of the contplaint. No reply to this was re.
quired because the answer merely controverts the
complaint and the only reply that would have been
n1ade on the facts is a reiteration of the con1plaint
(See Bancroft, Code Pleading, Se~c. 2192 and the
ca.se there cited,
Tate v. Rose, 35 Utah 229; 99 Pac. 1003).
Furthermore, the failure to reply, if neocessary, was
waived by ap·p~ellant 's g10ing to trial on the merits.
Allen v. Schultz, (Wash.), 181 Pac. 916,
918; 6 A.L.R. 676.
Hardin's Committee v. Shehnan, 245 Ky.
508; 53 s. w. (2d) 923.
Von Eime v. Fuchs, 320 1\tio. 746; 8 S. W.
(2'd) 824.
Cochran v. Cochran, 133 Wash. 415 ; 233
P~ac. 918.
Jenkins v. Spedden, 136 1\!Id. 637; 111 At.
136.

FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS O·N MATE·
RIAL FACTS RAISED BY APPELLANT.
Appellant's brief con1plains of the court's failure
to make findings on the lease from L. H. Gray to
appellant (p. 21); and on possession of Section 31
( p. 25) ; als1o of finding No. IV said to be ''not sup·
ported by any evidence whatever. It is contrary
to the undisputed and record evidence." (Br. 27).
It was :unnecessary to make a finding as
3. Finding No. IV (Tr. 30) finds that
Countv on and after April 24, 1938, was
of Section 31. That obvjates a finding

to Exhibit
Salt Lake
the owner
as to Ex-
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hibit 3 'vhich is of necessity 1nade abortive by the
finding.

As to the finding on possession, finding No. V
definitely states that defendant went into lawful
possession of Section 31 on or about ~lay 4, 1938,
for one year, during 'Yhich tin1e respondent was out
of possession. Finding No. VIII is supported by
evidence, despite appellant's statement (Br. 25).
The evidence establishes that respondent was in
possession in 1939, placed extra n1en to protect the
wheat, and permitted appellant to harvest his crop
without molestation (Tr. 73, 75, 112, 113, 115, 158).
Appellant romplains generally, but points out nothing 'vhieh supports his complaining1.
:\ppellant attacks finding No. IV as above quoted.
The finding itself states the facts upon which it is
based ( SeP Exhibits A, B, C).

RIGHT TO H.._t\RVEST CR.Q·P

At pages. 33 and 35 of his brief appellant states a
rule that an agricultural tenant holds land for an
additional year unless given notice to quit within
~ixty days after his term expires. R. S. U. 104-60-4.
Appellant's term expired ~{ay 4, 1939 (Exhibit 1,
Finding V, Tr. 30). Respondent, successor to the
landlord's estate, advised appellant of termination
of appellant's lease by his presence on the land and
hy word of mouth in May of 1939 (Tr. 73, 75, 158;
Finding VIII).
Even if it he assumed that appellant's term was extrnded for a ~~ear to l\{ay 4, 1940, he cannot claim
for the- additional year to May 4, 1941, because he
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quirements) and he was a.gain notified to quit (Tr.
78, 83, 113; Exhibit I). Appellant was therefore a
trespasser when the wheat was planted in July ·or
August, 1940 (Tr. 79, 114), .and had no claim on the

crop.
Mehl v. Norton (Minn.), 275 N. W. 843; 113
A.L.R. 1055.
Annotations at 39 A.L.R. 958; 57 A.L.R.
584; 113 A.L.R. 1059; 95 A.L.R.
1127; 18 Am. Jur. 220-224.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is fully sup·
ported by all the evidence in this case and by the
applieable law. That the land in question was
owned by Salt Lake County at all times here
material, except subsequent to December, 1940,
when it wa.s sold subject to respondent's lease, is
not controverted by the evidenee. Thi~ gave re..
spondent the right to the possession which he had
'vhen appellant trespassed by plowing and planting.
R.espondent 's damage was amply pleaded, but even
if it had not been this objection was waived by
appellant's failure to object to the introduction of
evidence. The only real question in the case is the
possibility of an estoppel against plaintiff's ass.e~rt
ing the right he acquired from the County, which
right was supported by a title reeognized by both
the ap~pellant and the original le~ssor to both partieR. Respondent lost his possession and advised
his former landlord of that fact, although it was
already known to the landlord. He then, 'vith the
former landlord's knowledge, leased fro1n the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

holder of the t~x title and advised the appellant of
that fact, althoug·h appellant n1ust have kno,vn it
already through his inability or lack of desire to
obtain a renewal of his lease from the County given
in May, 1938. Here is no denial of a landlord, because the landlord has himself recognized the re'3pondent's lessor by purchasing the land from Salt
Lake County subject to respondent's lease. Any
presumption of holding under the former landlord
is fully dissipated, which respondent is entitled to

show.
The judgment of the district court is sound and
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.

RICHARDS & 1\IcKAY,
RICHARD L. BIR,D, JR.,

~[O.YI.JE,
AND

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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